Significant Release Of Never-Before-Seen Australian Government UFO Policy....
And Get Excited.... Because Some Of It Is Still Classified
Part 1
After months of
too’ing and fro’ing, I have successfully had the Australian Department of
Defence (DOD) declassify and release never-before-seen UFO policy material, and
a significant fraction of it is very interesting, to say the least.
But, first, I
would like to do what researcher Bill Chalker calls “due diligence” and clarify
a few things… Way back in 1984, The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) downgraded its
investigative responsibilities in regards to UFO sightings. No longer did the
RAAF’s Directorate of Air Force Intelligence (DAFI) base-level officers have to
investigate all UFO sightings submitted by the general public. This wasn’t a
huge blow, as RAAF officers were not compelled or trained to investigate
properly anyway. However, continuing RAAF policy stated that any UFO sighting, or
“Unusual Aerial Sighting” (UAS), which appeared to show a defence or security
threat would still be investigated. A Department of Defence press release on 2nd
May, 1984 stated, in part:
“The RAAF in future will investigate fully only
those Unusual Aerial Sightings (UAS) which suggest a defence or national
security implication. The Minister for Defence, Mr Gordon Scholes, said today
that while the RAAF would continue to be the first point of contact, UAS
reports not considered to have a defence or security implication would not be
further investigated.”
Fast forward 10 years, to 1994, and the
RAAF’s UAS Policy was downgraded further, to virtually nothing. “Enclosure 1 to
Air Force file AF 84 3508 Pt 1 – RAAF POLICY: UNUSUAL AERIAL SIGHTINGS” clearly
laid out, once and for all, that the RAAF would not accept or investigate any
reports of UFOs events. On January 4th, 1994, RAAF Wing Commander (later
Group Captain) Brett Biddington stated, on behalf of the Chief of Staff, Air:
“For many years the RAAF has been formally
responsible for handling Unusual Aerial Sightings (UAS) at the official level.
Consideration of the scientific record suggests that, whilst not all UAS have a
ready explanation, there is no compelling reason for the RAAF to continue to
devote resources to recording, investigating and attempting to explain UAS.”
I have always wondered about this
“scientific record”? Likewise, I have often been puzzled why more isn’t known
about this period of dying RAAF involvement with UAS. In November, 2013 I asked
RAAF officer Group Captain Brett Biddington (ret) about this interesting
period. The results of that short interview can be seen on Keith Basterfield’s
blog site here:
But what about an official paper trail?
The DOD doesn’t conclude a policy without some sort of administrative action
and tasking. There is always paperwork. On the 23erd September, 2015 I
submitted a Freedom of Information (FOI) request for:
“copies
of any and all material that was created or used to draft this policy
conclusion… …including any briefs; draft copies; memoranda; minutes of
meetings; references to secondary material used in decision making processes;
loose minutes; interagency correspondence; etc.”
On the 21st of December,
2015, I received a 42 page PDF from the Defence FOI desk which certainly contains
a never-before-seen administrative records from 1993 that helped formulate the
RAAF’s shift away from any UFO investigation. The first item of interest is a facsimile
transmission, dated 26th August, 1993, from Wg. Cdr. Brett
Biddington at the Directorate of Air Force Policy, Intelligence, Russell
Offices, Canberra to either Sqd. Ldr. Wright or Mr Barnett, RAAF Intelligence
Office, Melbourne. The “SUBJECT” of the transmission is a handwritten note stating
“Draft UAS Policy”. Immediately below is a section called
“INSTRUCTIONS/MESSAGE”, under which this brief note is made:
“Chris,
Draft UAS policy + background info as discussed. Hope this helps as an interim
measure. I sense no real problem exists in A block –
minor changes only are expected,
Regards….”
Below is an image of this transmission.
Enclosed with this facsimile is Wg. Cdr.
Biddington’s first, lengthy drafting of background information and suggestions
which would soon morph into the minimalist 1994 UAS Policy. The first surprise
is the security classification stamped top and bottom of every page. Traditionally,
Australia’s Defence community assigned one of five levels of sensitivity to
records: UNCLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL, RESTRICTED, SECRET and TOP SECRET. The
material presented here is stamped SECRET which is, despite what people think,
actually very rare for Australian UFO records. And, as we shall see, some of this
release still remains SECRET, or,
rather, has been redacted, even now in 2015! Still, most of Wg. Cdr.
Biddington’s efforts have been released. I will present each page, and focus on
some quite notable highlights. It should be noted that each paragraph starts
off with a letter indicating what security classification was assigned to that
particular section. (U) indicates it is UNCLASSIFIED, (C) indicates CONFIDENTIAL,
(R) indicates RESTRICTED and (S) indicates SECRET. Page 1 begins with a
paragraph of administrative and clerical text, which gives way to a more interesting
second paragraph, which was formally classified CONFIDENTIAL:
“2.
(C) The nub of current policy is that RAAF only investigates UAS deemed to have
defence or national security significance (whatever that means). I do not know
when the RAAF last conducted a thorough UAS investigation. It was probably in
1983 when I was involved with the sightings in the Bendigo area and, in a
separate incident, when Mirages and F-111s were brought to high states of alert
because of level Mach 3 paint on the Sydney radar. These were the incidents
that caused former policy to be reviewed and the current policy to be
determined.”
Paragraph 3, which was classified
RESTRICTED, states:
“3.
(R) There remains significant interest
in the community in UAS and the potential exists for the RAAF to be accused of:
a. withholding
documents about particular sightings incidences, or
b. neglecting
our national security obligations by not taking these matters seriously.”
At the very bottom of the page,
paragraph 4, which was classified SECRET, is where things get really
interesting. In fact, we can only see half the text in this paragraph, both on
this page and onto the next, because the DOD has redacted (blacked-out) it
under Section 47E of the FOI Act! More on this later. Here is the text we can
read. X X X X X’s signify such missing text:
“4.
(S)
In the past, responsibility for UAS has allowed X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X”
Below is the page in question.
The next page of Brett Biddington’s
draft material continues in this rather extraordinary manner:
“X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X The most recent example known to me occurred in the late 1970s/early 80s when a
RAAF SQDLDR was dispatched at short notice to central Queensland X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
How fascinating. A full four lines of
text are redacted. I will look at what the contents of this hidden material may
be in due course. Continuing on, paragraphs 5 and 6, which mention the vanishing of
pilot Frederick Valentich, raises a curious point about a logistical benefits
of official study of UAS:
“5. (U) At
a more mundane level, the UAS mechanism has provided information about missing and
crashed aircraft. The disappearance of the pilot Valentich into Bass Straight
(flying a Cessna) is a case in point.”
“6. (R) For
these reasons I do not think the RAAF can or should completely abrogate its responsibilities
regarding UAS.”
Paragraph 7, classified SECRET, is very
cryptic and may warrant much further study:
“7. (S) I
think that an extra-terrestrial threat to Australian security is not likely to develop
without some foreknowledge from astronomical and other surveillance systems. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X The means by which such searches might be conducted are numerous and will vary
with particular circumstances.”
Paragraph 8, UNCLASSIFIED, reads:
“8.
(U)
RAAF resources available to handle UAS reports and investigations are
going to become increasingly limited. Policy and procedures need to reflect
this reality whilst preserving our essential interests. Reference to the
Project Blue Book study of the 1950’s and 60’s is no longer considered relevant
or necessary.”
Beyond this, a whole new section, titled
“Suggested Policy”, begins:
“9. (U)
Suggested policy is:
The RAAF is that part of the Department of Defence that is formally responsible for handling UAS at the official level. Careful consideration of the scientific record suggests that whilst not all UAS have a ready explanation, there is no compelling reason for the RAAF to continue to devote resources to recording, investigating and attempting to understand or explain UAS.
The RAAF no longer accepts reports on UAS and no longer attempts assignment of cause or allocation of reliability. Members of the community who seek to report a UAS to RAAF personnel should be referred to a civil UFO research organisation in the first instance. Known organisations are listed at Annex A to this policy.”
The RAAF is that part of the Department of Defence that is formally responsible for handling UAS at the official level. Careful consideration of the scientific record suggests that whilst not all UAS have a ready explanation, there is no compelling reason for the RAAF to continue to devote resources to recording, investigating and attempting to understand or explain UAS.
The RAAF no longer accepts reports on UAS and no longer attempts assignment of cause or allocation of reliability. Members of the community who seek to report a UAS to RAAF personnel should be referred to a civil UFO research organisation in the first instance. Known organisations are listed at Annex A to this policy.”
The page ends there. The image is below.
Continuing on with the “Suggested
Policy” section, the next page reads:
“Some UAS may relate to events that could have a defence, security, or public safety implication, such as man-made debris falling from space or a burning aircraft. Developments in procedures, communications and surveillance technologies are such that these sorts of events are considered unlikely to occur without there being some indication to appropriate areas in Defence and to other civil authorities.
Where members of the community feel they may have witnessed an event of this type ie of human origin, they are encouraged to contact local authorities such as the police or else civil and military aviation authorities, including the RAAF.
The RAAF has accumulated a series of UAS reports dating back to the 1960s. The records that still exist are located centrally in Air Force Office (AFPOL INT). These may be accessed by researchers subject to them agreeing to respect the privacy of individuals who made the reports.”
“Some UAS may relate to events that could have a defence, security, or public safety implication, such as man-made debris falling from space or a burning aircraft. Developments in procedures, communications and surveillance technologies are such that these sorts of events are considered unlikely to occur without there being some indication to appropriate areas in Defence and to other civil authorities.
Where members of the community feel they may have witnessed an event of this type ie of human origin, they are encouraged to contact local authorities such as the police or else civil and military aviation authorities, including the RAAF.
The RAAF has accumulated a series of UAS reports dating back to the 1960s. The records that still exist are located centrally in Air Force Office (AFPOL INT). These may be accessed by researchers subject to them agreeing to respect the privacy of individuals who made the reports.”
Beyond this, another section begins. Titled
“Policy Implementation” and spread over two paragraphs, it reads:
“10.
(U) The suggested strategy for implementing this
policy is:
a. approve policy at appropriate level (DCAS?);
b. centralise all extant sighting records in
AFO (AFPOL INT);
c.
write to UFO organisations, notifying them of the change; and
d.
prepare and promulgate a press release outlining the new arrangements.
11. (U) A longer term
task will be to place all sighting records in the
Australian Archives at which point the final paragraph of the
proposed policy will require change. The privacy implications
of placing the records in the Archives will need to be
understood before this occurs.”
At the end of this page, the second last section of
the draft ensures. Titled “Conclusion” and classified RESTRICTED, it reads:
“12. (R) UAS matters can lead quickly to adverse
publicity. It's a ‘damned if you do and
damned if you don’t’ situation. The mere announcement of a change in
policy is likely to provoke some (limited)
reaction. Carefully managed this can be minimised at the same time that
essential, enduring interests are protected.”
Below is the page.
Finally, the last page of Brett
Biddington’s draft contains the inevitable “Recommendation” section. Oddly,
there may be a typing error here, as he numbers it “12” when it should be, judging
by the numbering of paragraphs on the previous page, numbered “13”. Whatever
the format, it merely states:
“12. (U) It
is recommended that:
a. the new
policy as stated above (para 9) be endorsed, and
b. the implementation strategy (para 10)
be endorsed.”
B.
Biddington
WGCDR
AFPOL3
EXT 52422
Aug 93
This scant page is imaged below.
Note on the above last page there is
also the listing of an annex titled “Current UAS policy, dated Arp 84” which of
course refers to what was then the current UAS policy apparently in need of the
complete overhaul that Biddington was prescribing. We’ve seen some of the 1984
UAS material, so I will discuss it only briefly, and further along. For now,
what of the above material? The security classification level gave me degree of
surprise, but I take the common sense angle: In any lengthy DOD publication,
some paragraphs will be classified differently than others, and, indeed, the
above material ranged from UNCLASSIFIED to SECRET. But, overall, the
publication in its entirety has to be
classified at the level of the highest classified paragraph. I have seen bulky US
Air Force squadron histories classified SECRET merely because a few lines were classified
at that level; but in reality the vast majority of the publication does not warrant
this level of restriction. In the case of Brett Biddington’s draft UAS material,
it is expected that any such Directorate of Air Force Policy, especially coming
out of the Intelligence section, or “AFPOL3”, would have some sensitivities.
That is, if we still lived in 1993….
The redactions that we are interested in
here were done under Section 47E of the FOI Act. In one section of the DOD’s
final letter to me, it was stated that:
“…disclosure
of the information under section 47E would prejudice Defence’s ability to
obtain similar information in the future and would compromise the ability of
the RAAF to complete its mandated role, namely defending Australia and its
national interests from the air.”
Moreover, another paragraph stated, in
regards to the person making the final decision about the documents being
redacted:
“GPCAPT
Wallis is satisfied that the expected effect of disclosing to you material
identified exempt under section 47E(d) could have a substantial adverse effect
on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of Defence, in that once
the information was made publically available it could divulge areas of
capability interest.”
So what do we think they may say under
that black ink?
Take a look at parapgraph 4, which,
again, states:
“4. (S) In
the past, responsibility for UAS has allowed X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X The most recent example known to me occurred in the late 1970s/early 80s when a RAAF SQDLDR was dispatched at short notice to central Queensland X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
This tells me that the RAAF has been able
to use civilian UAS reporting to find, or attempt to find, manmade space junk
that has re-entered and crash landed – something absolutely inevitable in a
nation large as Australia. Various US Air Force collection memoranda and policy
justifications have stated that downed space junk, especially of Soviet or
otherwise Eastern Bloc origins are of considerable value. A November, 1961 USAF
HQ Intelligence memoranda laid out that crashed space junk was considered “items
of great technical intelligence interest” and that some of the duties of specialised
intelligence teams were to “expeditiously retrieve downed Soviet Bloc equipment”.
The text in our Biddington draft document mentions a RAAF officer having to
dispatch to central Queensland, and I presume it is regarding one of the
numerous instances when spherical cryogenic fuel containers came down there.
There is a possibility the redacted text is referring to something more
exciting, like an incident we have no idea about, or an especially large or
technically noteworthy piece of space hardware.
A look again at another section of the
document that has significant redaction:
“7. (S) I think that an extra-terrestrial threat to Australian security is not likely to develop without some foreknowledge from astronomical and other surveillance systems. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X The means by which such searches might be conducted are numerous and will vary with particular circumstances.”
So far, I have only had this FOI release
in front of me for two days. I am continuing to study it, and, at 42 pages, there
is much more yet here. In Part 2 of this series I will focus on the final copy
of Brett Biddington’s material, and some other oddities in the release. This is
a somewhat major piece of history – that is if you are interested in the
official handling of the UFO issue by Australia’s government. Finally, I
mentioned above that the draft document contained an annex titled “Current UAS
policy, dated Arp 84”. To build or downsize a current policy, the official
doing the work must have to hand that paperwork, and, though we have seen much
of the earlier 1984 material before, I think it worth a quick look. After the
heading RAAF POLICY ON UNUSUAL AERIAL SIGHTINGS (UAS), the text goes like this:
“1. Project Blue Book conducted by the USAF between 1953-65 resulted in the ‘Condon Report’ which was published in 1968. The
report concluded that, ‘nothing has come from the study of UFO's in the past 21
years that has added to scientific
knowledge. Careful consideration of the record as it is available to us,
leads us to conclude that further extensive
study of UFO's probably cannot be justified in the expectation that science
will be advanced thereby’. Experience in the RAAF since the early 1950's
supports the Condon Report conclusion.
2. The
RAAF accepts reports on UAS and attempts an allocation of reliability. Those
which suggest a defence or security
implication are further investigated and a probable cause determined. Air Force Office (DAFIS) is to assess
the report after Command investigation. Reports considered not to have defence or security implications are not
investigated further, are filed at Formation Headquarters and reference to civil UFO research organizations
may be offered to the observer.”
Well done Paul. A nice Xmas present! All the best of the season to you and yours.
ReplyDeleteGood job, Paul. Interesting data.
ReplyDeleteBrilliant DR
ReplyDeleteVery good. Keep your research going,they're out there.
ReplyDeleteI actually watched the RAAF chasing two UFO's in 1983. The UFO's made them look silly, they played with those Jets like a cat plays with a mouse, but in the end they just left in a great hurry heading north. Their speed was so fast that they completely disappeared in a matter of seconds, about two at the most.
ReplyDeleteThe jets limped back to base rather red faced I should imagine.